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Contours of the mandate of truth commissions 
 
 
There are different types of political transition which shall be followed by long-term 
consolidation and fundamental changes in the structure of institutions and also in mind of the 
population. The course of gradual democratisation, a negotiated settlement of internal armed 
conflict or an overthrow of a repressive military regime create a special situation of urgent 
need for essential changes in life of the affected state or states and their society. In order to 
achieve an efficient transitional period, several measures are necessary to be taken. The actors 
of the conflict, former victims and perpetrators shall be reconciled with each other so that 
further conflictive events do not occur. Real reconciliation needs also a deep psychological 
change which is not easy to facilitate. Calling to account first of all those persons who bear the 
greatest responsibility for the human rights abuses committed during the conflict period is 
inevitable as well as drawing an overall picture about past events and the official 
acknowledgement of sufferings of the victims. Beyond these steps of the consolidation process 
also reasonable reparation ensured to these victims and usually great changes in institutional 
structure shall be realised in order to achieve the result of real changes, peace and security for 
the society. 
 
The present study is dedicated to one aspect of the extremely complex process of conflict 
resolution, namely to the question how the official acknowledgement of the truth can be 
facilitated by the special tool of truth commissions. After Priscilla B. Hayner the notion of 
truth commissions can be determined by four characteristics: first, it focuses on the past; 
second, it examines not only a singular event but creates an overall picture about abuses 
committed in a definite period of time; third, some sort of authority is ensured to the truth 
commission  that makes it possible to have greater access to information and greater security 
to undertake sensitive investigations; and finally, the function of a truth commission is limited 
for a period of time which is closed with the submission of a final report including its findings 
that is usually made public.2 
 
In the following chapters those elements of this notion are the subjects of attention that frame 
the mandate of truth commissions. Accordingly, the first central issue is the question how past 
events shall be examined by a commission and how shall be a balance ensured by investigating 
so many individual cases that can serve personal reconciliation of people and at the same time, 
                                                 
1 Eszter Kirs is university assistant at the Department of International Law of the University of Miskolc 
2 HAYNER, Priscilla B.: Past Truths, Present Dangers: The Role of Official Truth Seeking in Conflict Resolution 
and Prevention. In: International Conflict Resolution after the Cold War, Ed: Paul C. Stern and Daniel Druckman, 
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not only accomplishing separate analysis of these events but using the limited time well to 
create an overall picture of the past. In the focus of further analysis is the eventual role of truth 
commissions in criminal prosecutions and its relation with judicial bodies. Finally, the third 
chapter deals with the question how the identification of former perpetrators can affect the 
contribution of the commission to long-lasting reconciliation. 
 
 
Revelation of individual and general truth 
 
The duty of a truth commission to present an overall picture about past events plays an 
outstanding role related to its contribution to peace and consolidation. A state accepting its 
findings acknowledges the past officially and at the same time the political and legal 
responsibility that might flow from it. The findings of a commission cannot be handled like 
academic reports as they have such harsh consequences. Therefore, the objectivity of the 
examination of facts and their interpretation shall be ensured to the largest possible extent. 
 
It is not the duty of a truth commission to examine every single case, as it can be also 
impossible within the time limit of its mandate. On the other hand, reliable picture of the past 
cannot be drawn without factual evidences and sufficiently representative samples, and either 
the victim’s role in reconciliation cannot be forgotten. They cannot be expected to get over 
past abuses without ensuring them an accurate record about the events that occurred to them 
and without reparation for their sufferings that can be determined only by examining their case 
in a sufficiently detailed way. 
 
Each situation shall be examined separately as specific circumstances of the concrete cases can 
differ to such a large extent that totally different approach is necessary. Accordingly, the 
mandate of different commissions can cover examination of different aspects of the truth. In 
case of long armed conflicts ended by negotiations which have to touch numerous problematic 
aspects of a complex situation, the commission can be expected to analyze past events in their 
complexity. For instance, the 1991 Chapultepec Peace Agreement defined the mandate of the 
El Salvador Commission on the Truth that it should investigate serious acts of violence 
committed after 1980 which had such a harsh impact on society that the public urgently 
needed to know the truth.3 It is a very general mandate that ensured a broad space for the 
commission to decide what kind of concrete cases it intends to examine. In the course of its 
relatively short (8-9 months) function it presented 22,000 cases of disappeared, killed, tortured 
or kidnapped persons dealing with different sorts of crimes committed during the civil war.4 
Although in general, human rights organizations were satisfied with the findings and work of 
the commission, it was also criticized not having touched some significant problems such as 
the cases of death squads. At the same time, it must be mentioned that the mandate of a 
commission can be determined in a broad and general way, but the commission cannot be 
expected to analyze all the relevant cases. This task can be given eventually to follow-up 
commissions which can finish the work of the truth commission on the level of individual 
truth after it finished its function on the level of general truth. 
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Under different circumstances past events that shall be analyzed by the commission can be 
determined in a narrower way as well, either because of the limited time of function or the lack 
of financial resources which components might restrict besides the ability of the commission 
to accomplish the mission of presenting an overall picture of the past. Such a case was the one 
of Chile. The National Commission for Truth and Reconciliation was established in 1990 to 
investigate abuses resulting death or disappearance. (It was highly controversial that the 
mandate did not cover those cases of torture and other seriously violent acts that did not result 
death.) It worked for nine months and presented 3428 cases. The great difference between the 
number of elaborated cases before the El Salvador and the Chilean commission is visible. The 
main reason was that the Chilean commission preferred investigating each case thoroughly to 
drawing a general picture about the truth. The practical reason was that one of the main aims 
of the commission was to find the whereabouts of the disappeared persons. This main focus 
can be seen not only on the mandate of the commission but also on the fact that after the 
Retting Commission ended its function, the government established a “National Corporation 
for Reparation and Reconciliation” to go on with the work of the commission investigating the 
unsolved cases, finding the whereabouts of disappeared victims and oversee reparations to 
victims.5  
 
This kind of follow-up truth seeking bodies can be necessary also because of the fact that time 
limit of the function of truth commissions usually hinders it to reveal the details of all cases. 
Truth commissions are usually established for a period of one to three years. There are 
examples where there was no time limit determined for the work of the commission, but these 
cases are not good examples to follow if we consider the need of efficiency. It is well-
illustrated by the examples of early commissions: in Bolivia after three years of work in 1984 
and in the Philippines after one year in 1987 the commissions were dissolved without ever 
publishing a final report,6 so without completing their main task of presenting an overall 
picture of the past. On the other hand, when the question of how long the commission should 
perform its function, another dilemma arises: how to find the balance between the desire for a 
detailed report and an accurate case-analysis and the significance of presenting the final report 
as soon as possible so that it can contribute to consolidation in the most critical period of 
democratic changes. 
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Relation between commission investigations and criminal prosecutions 
 
The need for deep analysis of cases cannot be separated from the need for repression, 
and it is always a question whether any role should be given to a truth commission in criminal 
proceedings. 
 
This question is not relevant in the case where amnesty is declared before the truth 
commission is set up. It also can happen that after the commission finished its work a blanket 
amnesty is granted to all the persons affected by its investigations, such as in El Slavador where 
a week after the Truth Commission published its report, general amnesty was declared. 
(Moreover, the military responded to the report with a long, written statement, presented by 
the Defence Minister on the national television, which qualified the acts of the commission as 
illegal.7 This kind of lack of political will for supporting the improvement of reconciliation 
obviously undermines the efficiency of the work of the commission.) 
 
There are only a few examples where the proceedings before the truth commission 
were connected to criminal trials, such as in Bolivia and Argentina, where criminal trials could 
have been commenced as a result of truth commission investigations.8 Besides, special 
alternatives can also be considered, such as the example of Ethiopia where not a truth 
commission was expected to accomplish investigations that eventually could have been used 
by the criminal court, but on the contrary, the Special Prosecutor’s Office was entrusted to 
publish a truth-commission-like report about the abuses committed during the Mengistu 
regime. However, finally the SPO dropped the plan of publishing the report as it decided to 
concentrate only on prosecutions.9 
 
The question how to regulate the relation between truth commissions and criminal courts shall 
be decided always on a case by case basis as different circumstances require different solution, 
but the less optimal situation is where this issue is not regulated at all, such as in the case of 
Sierra Leone. The Act on the establishment of the Commission declared its absolute 
independence. Besides, the priority of the Special Court to the national judicial bodies ensured 
by its Statute could not apply to the Commission as it was not a judicial body. In this way, they 
were working totally separately from each other that led to the duplication of work, waste of 
time and financial resources. On the other hand, people themselves living in Sierra Leone were 
confused about the relation and separation of the two institutions. A short practical story 
about this kind of confusion: someone ordered a taxi told the driver he was going to the 
Special Court, and the driver took him to the office of the Commission.10 
 
One of the most significant questions related to the co-operation of the two bodies was the 
regulation of exchange of information. Despite the theoretical independence, the government 
gave a narrow discretion power to the Court to ask information from the Commission. In this 
case three conditions must have been fulfilled: the information requested must have been 
specific, essential to a fair determination of the innocence of the accused and it could not 
                                                 
7 HAYNER, Priscilla B.: supra note 4 page 629 
8 Id. page 604 
9 HAYNER, Priscilla B.: supra note 1 page 348 
10 TEJAN-COLE, Abdul: The Complementary and Conflicting Relationship between the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. In: Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law, Vol 5 (2005), 
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reasonably be obtained from any other source.11 The problem was that it was not clarified who 
is entitled to determine whether these conditions were met. 
 
This regulation served the so-called “conditional information sharing model”, but in 
practice the lack of concrete determination of conditions caused free exchange of information 
mainly towards the Special Court.12 It was a significant obstacle related to the participation of 
ex-combatants to the reconciliation process. Many of them were afraid that their statements 
given to the Commission would be used against them, or after these statements they would be 
subpoenaed to the Special Court as a witness in the proceeding of their commanders whom 
they were still depended on. 
 
Identification of former perpetrators and the possibility of victimization 
 
Deciding about the question whether truth commissions should play a kind of subsidiary role 
beside judicial bodies another dilemma arises whether it shall publicly name individuals 
involved in the specific cases elaborated. Naming perpetrators can be equal as pronouncing 
them guilty. In this case guarantees of a due process shall be ensured which are not the same 
before a truth commission as those required by a judicial body. The El Salvador Commission 
made clear the degree of certainty related to evidences. It based its findings (1) on highly 
convincing evidence, (2) on substantial, very solid evidence or (3) on those evidences which 
were more to support the finding of the Commission than to contradict it.13 It is obvious that 
these requirements are not as strict as the guarantees ensured according to the presumption of 
innocence applicable before criminal courts. The dilemma is given whether it is a right decision 
to name names especially considering the eventual tragic “street-consequences” if the security 
of the affected persons is not ensured sufficiently.  
Obviously, the decision is highly influenced by the fact whether there is a political will to 
publish names of former perpetrators that very often fails such as in the case of Chile as an 
example for negotiated transition to democracy, where those persons who held the greatest 
responsibility for past tragic events still occupied senior positions within the state apparatus. 
 
Irrespectively of the reasons, not to name names raises the question how truth can be told 
without identifying the actors involved in past events. The El Salvador Commission clearly 
rejected the possibility of an “abstract” analysis stating: 
“[…] the whole truth cannot be told without naming names. After all the Commission was not asked to write 
an academic report on El Salvador, it was asked to investigate and describe exceptionally important acts of 
violence and to recommend measures to prevent the repetition of such acts. […] Not to name names would be to 
reinforce the very impunity to which the Parties instructed the Commission to put an end.”14 
 
Although the opinion of the Commission is clear and understandable, the last sentence can be 
debated. Truth commissions are established not to solve all the problems and accomplish all 
the duties deriving from democratic changes and the need for reconciliation. 
 
                                                 
11 Id. page 327 
12 PRIDE (Post-conflict Reintegration Initiative for Development and Empowerment): Ex-Combatant Views of 
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Special Court in Sierra Leone. Freetown, 2002. 
www.ictj.org/downloads/PRIDE%20report.pdf page 18 
13 MATTAROLLO, Rodolfo: supra note 2 page 318 
14 MATTAROLLO, Rodolfo: supra.note 2 page 318 
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Besides, there is always a high risk of victimization. It shall be determined in each case who are 
the perpetrators and whose cases shall be examined by the commission. Although in most 
cases the offences committed by regular armed or security forces are more systematic in their 
nature, full truth cannot be revealed without dealing with crimes committed by members of 
resistance movements. In the case of South Africa the Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
declared as a fundamental principle of its work that it intends to reveal the acts committed by 
both sides. It emphasized in its Final Report that the idea of “just war” cannot entitle 
liberation movements to commit crimes: 
 
“A venerable tradition hold that those who use force to overthrow or even to oppose an unjust system 
occupy the moral high ground over those who use force to sustain that same system…This does not mean that 
those who hold the moral high ground have carte blanche to the methods they use.”15 
 
It was a noble aim of the Commission, however, it was often criticised for having prepared a 
visibly “ANC-influenced” report. The South African case is not unique that there was a risk of 
victimization. For instance, the Compensation Act based on the findings of the Peruvian Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission does not consider terrorists as victims even if they died as a 
result of criminal acts, even if they were tortured or disappeared. After the opinion of Salomón 
Lerner, who was the President of the Commission, although they handled these persons as 
victims, the people would not have been able to accept any reparation given to them.16  
 
It is obvious that not only the political environment but also the opinion of the population can 
affect the work of a commission and the picture of past drawn by it. These circumstances and 
the personal interpretation of the commissioners leave its traces on the objectivity of the 
commission. Nevertheless, it cannot be forgotten that the truth revealing work of the 
commission is only one and rather a first and not the last step of the long process of facing the 
past and getting over it. It is a complex process and the work of the commissions is only one 
element in the “transitional machine”. Truth seeking, justice, ensuring reparation to the 
victims, a significant psychological change in mind of the affected social groups and 
democratic changes in the structure of institutions compose together the system of necessary 
measures that shall be taken in order to realise reconciliation. 
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